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1. Introduction 
1.1. Description of ADRN 
The Administrative Data Research Network (ADRN) is a 
UK-wide partnership between academia, government 
departments and agencies, national statistical authorities, 
funders and the wider research community to facilitate new 
economic and social research based on routinely collected 
government administrative data.
The Network is establishing a new legal, secure and efficient 
pathway for the research community to access de-identified 
linked administrative datasets. 
This will potentially benefit our society by providing a  
greater evidence base to inform policy.
The Network consists of:
	 u	four Administrative Data Research 
 		Centres (ADRCs):
	 	 ADRC England: led by the University of 
 		 		Southampton
	 	 ADRC Northern Ireland: led by Queen’s 
 					University Belfast
	 	 ADRC Scotland: led by the University of 
 					Edinburgh
	 	 ADRC Wales: led by Swansea University
	 u	an overarching Administrative Data Service, 
 		which is the co-ordinating body of the Network
	 u	administrative data owners
	 u	the Economic and Social Research Council 
					(the funding body)
	 u	the UK Statistics Authority  
 		(chairing the ADRN Board)
The Network has commissioned this guide to support the 
development of knowledge and skills in the subject topic 
area.
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1.2. Purpose of this guide and 
who it is aimed at
This guide requires no previous knowledge or experience of the 
topic. It is aimed at academic researchers who have an association 
with the Administrative Data Research Network as well as at a 
general audience interested in the subject matter. For Network 
researchers, the document will serve as useful background for the 
legal aspects of the certification training they receive before they 
can access the service. Wider audiences might be interested in how 
the Network’s secure environment ensures the data access we allow 
is fair and lawful.
The guide sets out the legal background to data protection laws 
in the UK, and offers a broad explanation of the current law 
relating to data sharing and linkage, as well as a consideration of 
the implications of the impending EU General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016 (GDPR). There is also consideration of some 
non-legal issues surrounding the topic. Readers can refer to the 
Network’s website for further information, and should consult 
professional legal advice on any specific legal points.
EU law will still apply to the UK as an EU Member State until the UK 
formally withdraws from the European Community and enters into 
a ‘withdrawal agreement’ in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty 
on the European Union. The EU Treaties will cease to apply to the 
UK once the withdrawal agreement is implemented. The withdrawal 
agreement is likely to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 
(which forms the basis of the UK membership of the EU) and the UK 
may have to take steps to make sure EU laws which are currently 
directly effective in the UK continue to apply.
It has already been confirmed by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) that the GDPR will apply in the UK from 25 May 2018 
and the ICO has also confirmed that the Data Protection Act 1998 
remains in force in the UK irrespective of the referendum result. The 
government has confirmed that the UK’s decision to leave the EU will 
not affect the commencement of the GDPR. 
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2. Data protection legislation and its 
 impact on data sharing
When considering the legal issues surrounding data protection and the use of data for  
research in the UK, it is necessary to understand the relationship between domestic  
(national) law and European Union law. For the purposes of this guide, it is useful to  
subdivide the legal structure in the UK into national law, European law (which has been  
implemented into UK law), and UK statutes (written laws that have been passed by an  
Act of Parliament). Wherever there is conflict between the provisions of EU law and  
domestic (national) law of an EU Member State, then EU law will (for the time being) prevail 
according to the principle of supremacy.
There is no single source of law that regulates the use and sharing of personal data.  
The collection, use and dissemination of personal data are governed by several different 
laws. The principal ones in relation to data sharing are most prominently the Data  
Protection Act 1998, the common law tort of breach of confidence; the Human Rights Act 
1998 (and the European Convention on Human Rights); and the Statistics and Registration 
Services Act 2007. 
2.1. The Data Protection Act 1998
The Data Protection Act (DPA) became law in the UK on 1 March 2000, and implements  
EU Directive 95/46. It is the keystone in UK information law which regulates the uses of  
personal data held manually or on computer. The aim of the Act is to protect the rights of 
the individual about whom data is obtained (‘the data subject’), stored, processed or  
supplied. The Information Commissioner is responsible for overseeing and promoting 
compliance with the DPA; and the ICO has a wide range of criminal and non-criminal tools 
available for regulatory action.
The DPA applies to ‘personal data’ (Section 1), which is defined as data relating to a living  
individual who can be identified either from that data alone, or from that data in  
conjunction with other data in the data controller’s possession. The Act also refers to  
‘sensitive personal data’ (DPA Section 2), such as race, politics or religion to which more 
stringent rules apply. Personal data must be processed in accordance with the eight data 
protection principles set out in the DPA. ‘Processing’ includes the holding, obtaining,  
recording, use, disclosure and sharing of information.
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The ICO has provided further guidance on the standard to apply to decide what is personal 
data and identifiability:
“The starting point might be to look at what means are available to identify an individual 
and the extent to which such means are readily available. For example, if searching a public 
register or reverse directory would enable the individual to be identified from an address 
or telephone number, and this resource is likely to be used for this purpose, the address 
or telephone number data should be considered to be capable of identifying an individual. 
When considering identifiability it should be assumed that you are not looking just at the 
means reasonably likely to be used by the ordinary man in the street, but also the means 
that are likely to be used by a determined person with a particular reason to want to identify 
individuals. Examples would include investigative journalists, estranged partners, stalkers, 
or industrial spies. Means of identifying individuals that are feasible and cost-effective, and 
are therefore likely to be used, will change over time. If you decide that the data you hold 
does not allow the identification of individuals, you should review that decision regularly in 
light of new technology or security developments or changes to the public availability of 
certain records. Taking this into account, a person who puts in place appropriate technical, 
organisational and legal measures to prevent individuals being identifiable from the data 
held may prevent such data falling within the scope of the Directive’’ (2012(b):9).
2.1.1. The eight data protection principles
The ‘data protection principles’ (set out in DPA Part 1 of Schedule 1) require that personal 
data should be:
u	processed fairly and lawfully
u	obtained only for one or more specified lawful purpose
u	adequate, relevant and not excessive for its purpose(s)
u	accurate and where necessary, kept up to date
u	not kept for longer than is necessary
u	processed in accordance with the data subject’s rights under the DPA
u	secure
u	not transferred outside the EEA unless an adequate level of data protection is 
		ensured
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2.1.2. Fairly and lawfully  
In order to ‘fairly’ process personal data (DPA Part II of Schedule 1), regard must be had:
u	to the method by which the personal data are obtained
u	that the person obtaining the information is authorised, or required by, or 
		under any enactment, to obtain it
u	that the following information is made ‘readily available’ to the data subject:
1. the identity of the data controller or any nominated representative
2. the purpose(s) for which the data are intended to be processed
3. any further information necessary to enable the processing to be fair
The personal data will only be deemed to be ‘lawfully’ processed where it is in accordance 
with at least one of the conditions set out in Schedule 2 of the DPA:
u	the data subject has given consent to the processing
u	the performance of a contract
u	in compliance with a legal obligation, other than a contract
u	in the vital interests of the data subject
u	where it is necessary for the administration of justice or for the exercise of 		
		certain specified functions; or where the processing is necessary for the  
		legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or third party to whom the 		
		data are disclosed, without infringing the rights of the data subject
With regard to schedule 2, the Network lawfully processes on the basis of legitimate 
interest or consent.
It is worth particularly noting that – in terms of compliance with the DPA (and the Human 
Rights Act 1998) – one does not necessarily always need consent of the data subject to 
share their personal data. The DPA sets out seven possible criteria under Schedule 2 for the 
legitimate processing of personal data (and sharing, like using, is for the most part just 
another form of processing), and if any one of the criteria is met, the DPA test is satisfied.
Furthermore, consent in relation to personal data does not need to be explicit – it can be 
implied. More stringent rules apply to sensitive personal data, when consent does need to 
be explicit if that criterion is used, but criteria other than consent can still be used for 
sensitive personal data. Even without explicit consent for the sharing of sensitive personal 
data, it is still possible to share the data legitimately if this is necessary in order to exercise 
any statutory function, or to protect the vital interests of the data subject where, for 
example, consent cannot be given.
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If the information to be processed is sensitive personal data, the proposed processing will 
need to satisfy a further condition in Schedule 3 of the DPA, in addition to the Schedule 2 
condition. The most common Schedule 3 conditions likely to be satisfied will be where the 
data subject(s) has given “explicit consent” for the processing (Schedule 3 condition 1); or 
where the information “has been made public … by the data subject” (Schedule 3 condition 
5); or specifically with regard to the processing of sensitive personal data for research 
purposes, the data must relate to research activities that are “in the substantial public 
interest”. 
This last condition is the one that is most relevant to the Network, and is why – as part of 
any application for access to data through the Network – a researcher has to demonstrate 
the potential public benefit of his or her research when the information being processed 
contains sensitive personal data.
2.2. Research, history and statistics  
  (Section 33)
Section 33 of the DPA provides specifically for certain exemptions in respect of the 
processing (or further processing) of personal data for research purposes. The term 
‘research purposes’ is not defined in the DPA, other than clarifying that it includes statistical 
or historical purposes. This exemption is important to the Network because data-holding 
government departments often rely on it to be able to share data, even in the highly secure 
setting of the Administrative Data Research Centres. 
For this reason the wording of this exemption – what it allows and what it does not – is 
one factor in determining the design of services like the Network. It is therefore valuable for 
researchers to understand section 33 so they understand why the Network does things the 
way that it does.
Section 33 only applies as an exemption where the (further) processing of personal data for 
research is exclusively for such purposes and, also, where:
u	the personal data are not processed to support actions affecting particular 
		individuals
u	the processing does not take place ‘in such a way that substantial damage or 
		distress is, or is likely to be, caused to any data subject’
This so-called ‘research exemption’ is quite narrow and it only affects three of the data 
protection principles:
u	the second (relating to the purpose for which the data were obtained)
u	the fifth (the duration for which the data can be kept)
u	the sixth (relating to a data subject’s right of access under s.7 DPA)
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Where the exemption applies, therefore:
u	the further processing of personal data for research is permitted, irrespective of
		the original reason for collecting the data
u	the personal data may be kept indefinitely, despite the fifth data protection
		principle
u	it will be exempt from the data subject’s rights of access (Section 7) if they are
		processed in compliance with the relevant conditions
u	the results of the research or any resulting statistics are not made available in a
		form which identifies or causes harm to the data subject(s)
The section 33 ‘research exemption’ does not give a blanket exemption from all of the 
data protection principles which apply to personal data that are provided and/or used for 
research. Researchers wishing to use personal data must be aware that most of the data 
protection principles will still apply and must be adhered to.
2.3. Other law and legislation pertaining to  
  data sharing 
If personal data is shared without the consent of the data subject, but in a manner that is in 
accordance with the DPA, this may nevertheless contravene other laws such as the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA, which embeds the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 
UK law) and the common law duty of confidentiality. 
The duty of confidentiality provides that where there is a confidential relationship, such as 
doctor/patient, the person receiving the confidential information is under a duty not to pass 
on the information to a third party. To be protected by this duty, the information has to have 
a ‘quality of confidence’ and it has to have been given in circumstances giving rise to an 
expectation of confidentiality. However, confidentiality is not an absolute right and  
information can be shared without breaching the common law duty if:
u	the information is not confidential in nature
u	the person to whom the duty is owed has given explicit consent
u	there is an overriding public interest in disclosure; or
u	sharing is required by a court order or other legal obligation
There is no single definition of what constitutes public interest. In the context of  
information disclosure, it must be decided case by case whether the public interest is 
achieved by disclosing the information or keeping it confidential. Public interest  
justifications may include protecting individuals from the risk of serious harm, or to enable 
secondary uses of information, such as for research purposes, which will benefit society 
over time (for further information see the Scottish Health Informatics Programme website). 
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If, after considering these factors, it is decided that the information should be disclosed, the 
disclosing body must only disclose the minimum of information necessary to achieve the 
objective of the research project, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
In addition, sharing information may be a breach of an individual’s Article 8 ‘right to respect 
for private and family life’ (found in Article 8(1) of the HRA). The scope of Article 8 is broad 
and covers the collection, use and exchange of personal data. When considering Article 8, it 
is necessary to take into account not only the content of the data, but also the anticipated 
use of the data.
The right to private life is not absolute, though, as Article 8(2) HRA justifies interference with 
the right if it is:
1. in accordance with the law
2. in pursuit of a legitimate aim
3. necessary in a democratic society
Therefore, when disclosing information, article 8(2) requires a balancing exercise between 
the rights of the individual to whom the information relates and the pursuit of legitimate 
interests – and, where the balance is in favour of the latter, whether sharing the information 
is a proportionate response to this interest.
Thus, neither the common law duty of confidence nor the Human Rights Act 1998 prevent 
the sharing of personal information, as long as the common law duty of confidence and the 
rights enshrined within the Human Rights Act 1998 are balanced against the effect on the 
individual or others of not sharing the information. Any information disclosure, even if  
justified, must also comply with the DPA 1998 (described above).
The Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 (SRSA) applies specifically to data  
designated as ‘official statistics’ and includes statistics produced by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS), central government, and devolved administrations. It provides that  
‘personal information’ which relates to and identifies an individual or business, and which is 
held or disclosed by the Statistics Authority, is confidential (SRSA section 39(1)). 
The SRSA does permit certain specified disclosures of personal information held by it  
(SRSA section 39(1)), which includes to an ‘approved researcher’, i.e. an individual to whom 
the Statistics Authority has granted access for the purposes of statistical research  
(SRSA section 39(5)). Other specific statutory gateways may permit data sharing.
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3. Lawful data access and  
 data sharing
 
If sharing personal data for research is to be lawful, the organisations holding the data need 
to address the data protection compliance issues that are likely to arise. Depending on the 
nature of the access, the researchers seeking access to the data may also need to address 
these issues. This requires a consideration of the legal constraints on data sharing in the UK 
mentioned above. 
The main questions are: 
u	Would the data sharing breach any common law duty of confidence?
u	Would the data sharing amount to a breach of any human rights?
u	Would the researcher applying for access to personal data need to acquire an
		‘approved researcher’ status?
u	Would the data sharing be in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998,
		and in particular with the data protection principles contained therein?
A decision has to be made as to whether it is appropriate to share personal data for a  
particular purpose. In this context, a secure setting such as the Network can provide  
researchers access to data, which would otherwise be unlikely to be shared. 
These proven methods of safely accessing and sharing datasets in a safe-setting 
environment improves the level of access to data for certified researchers; and reduces  
the risk of a breach of security of the personal data that is being shared.
In the Network, researchers are only given access to de-identified administrative data  
(i.e. data that have had information that directly identifies individuals removed) in a secure 
setting. Such data have already been functionally anonymised for use by researchers, so 
that the user is not – at the point of use – processing personal data. 
Statistical outputs from the researcher may be released for publication, but these are 
checked by an output checker who works with the researcher to make sure such outputs 
are non-disclosive.1 This process in turn makes sure no personal data is released.
1 See Lowthian and Richie’s forthcoming guide to disclosure control in this series for further details about this 
process.
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3.1. Data linkage
Data linkage is an increasingly important feature of research in the health and social  
sciences. When conducting research, we gather an immense amount of information, yet 
there may be administrative data (routinely collected government data such as health, 
education, or economic records) that can enhance, compliment or improve this collected 
information. Administrative data can provide researchers with a rich source of information, 
but it is often not designed for research or statistical use. Linking different data together 
can provide more comprehensive and useful material for data analysis. Data linkage may 
be between administrative data from different sources, or it may be between administrative 
data and other non-administrative data (such as longitudinal survey data).2  
The Network seeks to establish relationships with data holders to facilitate data access, 
which may result in linked data being securely analysed by researchers. In the ADRN, data 
are linked together by a trusted third party (TTP) so that neither Network staff nor  
researchers see any data that identifies data subjects. The mechanism also prevents  
personal data being shared between the various organisations (e.g. government  
departments).
Despite these safeguards, data linkage still represents a form of processing personal data 
(from the view point of the data holder who must carry out data processes to facilitate 
the linkage) – so the whole process still falls within the gamut of the legislation described 
above. Whether the linkage is deemed fair and lawful may also depend on specific  
legislation pertaining to particular organisations (for example HMRC’s capacity to share data 
is also delimited by the Commissioners for Customs and Revenue Act 2005).
It is advisable to investigate the potential for linkage while designing your research by 
speaking to Network staff and/or the data owners to consider the feasibility of linkage,  
potential identifiers, consent permission wording (if applicable) and ethical issues.
2 See Harron’s (2016) guide to data linkage in this series for more details on data linkage processes.
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3.2. Data security 
Sharing information can bring many benefits, and in the context of academic research, it is 
a time-efficient way of facilitating the dissemination of information. But sharing information 
also presents risks.
The seventh data protection principle (set out in DPA Part 1 of Schedule 1) requires that 
personal data must be kept secure. In order to comply with the DPA, it is crucial that 
data is properly protected and the identity of data subjects safeguarded. As information 
systems and the worldwide web become more complex and widespread, so the potential 
for information about individuals’ private lives to become known increases. As a practical 
consequence of this, when deciding to share personal data, both the party seeking access 
and the data provider need to identify the objective of the share, and then consider the 
potential benefits and risks.  
The privacy risk involved in any data sharing will depend on the specific circumstances of 
the data and the situation. A risk assessment should be carried out whenever a decision 
is to be made about whether or not to disclose personal data. The Network advocates 
having carefully considered procedures in place that meet the principles of the five safes 
(safe settings, safe data, safe projects, safe researchers and safe outputs – see Desai et al 
(2014) for a full description of this framework). Each Administrative Data Research Centre 
in the Network has a set of controls in place to assess and minimise the risk of disclosure 
occurring when a researcher is using administrative data. In addition, Centre staff must 
clear a researcher’s final data analysis as safe, before the results are released back to the 
researcher. It is only at that point that the research results are permitted to leave the secure 
environment. (The data collection itself never leaves the secure environment.)
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4. Issues beyond the law 
Compliance with the law only provides a partial explanation as to why data holding  
organisations do not disclose information to third parties when they have the legal power 
to do so. 
The importance of public perception and trust have been identified as reasons why  
organisations and those working in them do not disclose information, irrespective of 
whether they have the power to do so in law. Reported levels of trust vary depending on 
whether an individual is asked whether public bodies should “collect and use” personal  
information or whether they should “share” personal information. Use of the term “data 
sharing” appears itself to reduce public trust and confidence. Trust is fragile and easily  
undermined by breaches of data security. Trust and confidence are also undermined  
where there is a perception that information is supplied for profit, even if the benefit  
goes to public services. Individuals may have different attitudes regarding their trust in:  
the overall system, individual officials they deal with, different institutions and particular 
sectors, for example local government or the NHS. It is also difficult to measure in advance, 
or predict the impact of particular proposals on, public trust and confidence.
Other non-legal issues include:
u	Risk aversion and the common belief that it is more risky to disclose than not
		to. This may be increasingly misleading given the potential obligations on
		public bodies to share data that is in the public interest; and the potential legal
		avenues to hold public bodies to account in promises to share data (e.g. via
		judicial review of decisions that are not made appropriately transparent/not
		adequately consulted upon etc.).
u	Exaggerated fears of enforcement action, in particular a fear of individual 
		liability when in fact responsibility will rarely fall with an individual – it will
		usually fall higher (i.e. with an employer etc.).
u	IT and organisational systems differing between institutions.
All these issues mean that facilitating access to data can be a challenge, even through the 
secure mechanism of the Network. These issues also emphasise the need for identifying 
and communicating the public benefit deriving from Network projects. 
For the UK research community, the Network represents an important opportunity to  
inspire confidence in trustworthy data sharing through the rigorous training and  
certification of safe researchers and the transparent and secure operating procedures.  
If public trust is not inspired, this can have major implications for the success, reputation 
and longevity of a public-facing project such as the Network. The same applies to building  
relationships with data-sharing Government departments. 
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5. The future: EU General Data  
 Protection Regulation 2016
The final text of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was published in April 
2016.3 The GDPR replaces EU Directive 95/46/EC, and will take effect on 25 May 2018, after 
a two-year implementation period. It will regulate the use of personal data and the free 
movement of such data across all sectors.
The 1995 Directive was a legislative act that set out an operating framework that all EU 
countries had to deliver, but left it to individual countries to implement their own laws and 
regulate their own interpretation of those laws. In contrast, the GDPR is a directly binding 
legislative act that must be applied in its entirety across the EU. Under the GDPR, individual 
member states may maintain or introduce additional conditions or limitations relating to 
certain issues, such as the processing of genetic or health data, so long as these are not 
incompatible with the Regulation itself.
How the Regulation will be implemented in practice is still being worked out. However, the 
provisions relevant to the Network include:
u	Enhanced direct obligations and liabilities on data processors, including to 
		maintain certain records of all processing activities and take appropriate
		security measures to protect personal data: “to ensure a level of security
		appropriate to the risk”.
u	Data protection safeguards to be built into organisations’ products and services
		from the earliest stage of development (this is also known as ‘privacy by
		design’). Privacy-friendly techniques such as pseudonymisation will be
		encouraged.
u	Legal requirements for data processors to notify data controllers without undue
		delay after becoming aware of a data breach.
u	A ‘Data Protection Officer’ must be appointed by all public authorities and those
		companies that perform certain risky data processing operations.
u	Citizens will gain more rights to control their data, such as the right for
		their data to be destroyed, the right to be forgotten, and being asked to give
		unambiguous consent for their data to continue to be used or shared.
u	Broad consent for scientific research is specifically allowed although more 
		specific consent options should be offered if compatible with the research.
u	Further processing for ‘scientific research’ is to be considered a compatible
		lawful basis.
3  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC’, referred to as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
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The Network already demonstrates best practice under the GDPR in several ways. For  
example, only certified researchers are given access to de-identified data, in a secure  
setting, and using TTPs to match data (see Data Security section above for further details). 
However, enhanced obligations on data processors and accompanying accountability and 
liability provisions mean it will be important for the Network to take steps to implement the 
requirements of the GDPR over the coming years. Further material on issues such as this 
will be published on the Network’s website in due course. 
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 [Online], available at: http://tinyurl.com/hmafux7 [Accessed: 15/6/2016].
EU: REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
 (General Data Protection Regulation) (2016) Strasbourg: Council of Europe [Online], 
 available at: https://tinyurl.com/ju74dm4 [Accessed 15/6/2016].
UK: STATISTICS AND REGISTRATION SERVICES ACT (2007) London: The Stationery Office  
 [Online], available at: http://tinyurl.com/UK-SRSA [Accessed: 30/5/2016].
UK: DATA PROTECTION ACT (1998) London: The Stationery Office [Online], available at:  
 http://tinyurl.com/UK-DPA98 [Accessed: 20/5/2016].
UK: HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (1998) The Stationery Office [Online], available at:  
 http://tinyurl.com/zuc322x [Accessed: 15/6/2016].
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8. Useful websites 
EU: EUROPA.LAW AND PUBLICATIONS, available at: http://tinyurl.com/ju74dm4  
 [accessed 15/6/2016]. EUR-LEX section of the EU official site provides free access to 
 EU law including Directives, Regulations and other related publications.
UK: ADMINISTRATIVE DATA RESEARCH NETWORK, available at: https://adrn.ac.uk/  
 [accessed 15/6/2016]. This is official site of the ADMINISTRATIVE DATA RESEARCH 
 NETWORK (ADRN). It provides information on administrative data through its data  
 catalogue, as well as help and advice on how to apply to use the ADRN for research  
 using linked administrative data. The legal section of the ADRN website, available at:  
 https://adrn.ac.uk/adrn.ac.uk/getting-data/resources/legal/ [accessed 21/12/2016]  
 provides information on the legal framework that governs how the ADRN uses  
 administrative data for research.
UK: INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, available at: https://ico.org.uk/  
 [accessed 15/6/2016]. Is the UK’S independent authority set up to uphold  
 information rights in the public interests. It provides information and support on  
 data protection law and freedom of information law. 
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9. Glossary of non-standard terms 
Certified researcher: A researcher from academia, the public sector or a research 
organisation on the Research Councils UK (RCUK) list of eligible Independent Research 
Organisations (IROs) that: 
 
(i)  is a trusted ‘fit and proper’ person i.e. they must be capable of carrying  
  out the research either independently or under the direction of an  
  appropriate supervisor or lead investigator 
(ii)  has been granted access to de-identified Data by the respective Data  
  Controller(s) on an ADRN research project 
(iii) has successfully completed ADRN certification training, 
(iv) is backed by an Institutional Guarantor, and
(v)  has signed up to the ADRN Terms of Use (ADRN021).
Data breach: An incident in which data is unlawfully removed from a secure environment. 
A personal data breach means “a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful 
destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data 
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provisions of a public 
electronic communications service
Data processor: In relation to personal data, means any person (other than an employee of 
the data controller) who processes the data on behalf of the data controller.
Data controller: A ‘person’ recognised in law, i.e. individuals, organisations, other corporate 
and unincorporated bodies of persons, who (either alone or jointly or in common with 
other persons) determines the purposes for which, and the manner in which, any personal 
data are, or are to be, processed.
Data linkage: The process by which records about a single data subject across multiple 
Datasets are associated with each other to create a new ‘linked’ Dataset. 
Data matching: The process by which direct identifiers from different data sources are  
used to identify common data subjects. Alternatively, multiple sets of direct identifiers  
can be linked to a population spine (e.g. a count by age, sex and small area) to identify  
common Data Subjects. Within the ADRN data linkage process, the output of the data 
matching process is typically a set of matched IDs that can be used by the linker to link  
the research data.
De-identification: The process of removing or masking the direct identifiers with a dataset. 
Common strategies for de-identifying datasets are deleting direct identifiers, such as name, 
postcode and date of birth. Such identifiers might also be concatenated and replaced with a 
unique reference- a process called pseudonymisation.  
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De-identified data: Extracts from data which have undergone the process of  
de-identification. 
Direct identifier: Any data item that, on its own, could uniquely identify an individual case. 
It is sometimes referred to as a formal identifier, examples of which include a data subject’s 
name, address and unique reference numbers e.g. their social security number or National 
Health Service number.
Directive: A legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. However, 
it is up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals. 
EEA: European Economic Area
Functional anonymisation: is a process which controls disclosure risk by considering the 
totality of a data situation.
Indirect identifiers: These can in principle include any piece of information (or combination 
of pieces of information). For example, consider the following combination of information 
a ‘sixteen year old widow’, whilst age and marital status are not immediately obvious 
identifiers, our implicit demographic knowledge tells us that this is a rare combination. This 
means that such an individual could potentially be re-identified by, for example, someone 
spontaneously recognising that this record corresponded to someone they knew.
Institutional guarantor: An individual, at a Network researcher’s institution, with the legal 
status to act on behalf of that institution.
Statutory gateway: Legislation which enables access to personal data.
Personal data: Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified: (a) from those 
data or (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely 
to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any expression of opinion 
about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other 
person in respect of the individual. 
Regulation: A binding EU legislative act, which must be applied in its entirety across the EU.  
Secondary data: Data that has already been collected for a purpose other than the current 
research project which may also have value for research.
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Sensitive data: In the DPA this is data consisting of information as to a data subject’s: (a) 
racial or ethnic origin, (b) political opinions, (c) religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar 
nature, (d) whether they are a member of a trade union (within the meaning of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, (e) physical or mental health or  
condition, (f) sexual life, (g) commission or alleged commission by him of an offence, or  
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed, or alleged to have been committed by him, 
the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings.
Survey data: Data collected through surveys, typically for the purpose of producing 
statistics. By participating in a survey, data subjects may give general consent to using the 
data collected for research purposes.
Trusted third party (TTP): A data linkage environment that adheres to the principle of 
separation of identifying data and payload data, though the means of this separation may 
be operationalised differently at the different places. In the Network’s data linkage process, 
a TTP typically produces a set of matched IDs that can be used by the linker to link the 
research data. TTP activities can be carried out at a data controlling organisation, at an 
Administrative Data Research Centre or a separate organisation. In each case, there needs 
to be a clear separation of roles between matchers, linkers and certified researchers.
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